The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms Margaret Boden, (Basic Books, New York, 1991); 303 pages by Lustig, Roger
Artificial 
Intelligence 
ELSEVIER Artificial Intelligence 79 (1995) 83-96 
Book Review 
Margaret Boden, The Creative Mind: Myths and 
Mechanisms * 
Roger Lustig* 
35 Leigh Ave., Princeton, NJ 08542-3111, USA 
1. Introduction 
Until we know a lot more about how the brain enables ordinary thinking and 
remembering to happen, we shall not be in a position to ask sensibly how 
Mozart’s brain might have been different. 
The same applies to Mozart’s mind, to the structure-building strategies he 
used in composing his music. The better we understand everyday creativity, 
the better our chance of understanding Mozart. 
In the last analysis, perhaps we never shall. Scientists will never be able to 
answer all possible scientific questions. And in a case like this, the scientists 
need the help of the musicologists. Perhaps the musicologists, no matter how 
hard they try, will never manage to identify all the musical structures implicit 
in the operas, the symphonies and chamber music. It does not follow 
that Mozart’s genius was essentially mysterious, a matter of myth rather 
than mechanism. Supreme puzzle, he may be. But even he was human. (p. 
260) 
Browsing Margaret Boden’s book for discussions of music, I was interested to find 
musicologists like myself invited to aid in the enterprise of understanding 
creativity. Boden hopes to understand the creative process by making reference 
and analogy to the processes of computation, notably the ideas, procedures, and 
results of artificial intelligence. And AI research has used music in a variety of 
ways. 
Alas, the invitation was the best part. Boden has not presented any new 
insights into musical creativity; nor do her assertions about the nature of music, or 
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about the way we think about music. stand up to scrutiny. Boden is a seif- 
confessed musical amateur, and does not seem to be able to test the musical 
arguments she makes; and she takes some highly problematic assertions by others 
at face value. My aim is not merely to discredit the author’s competence to choose 
examples. Boden’s views of the nature of music and the value of creativity itself 
throughout history are disappointing. 
The curriculum vitae generally stands outside the body of a review, but I feel 1 
should describe myself&or at least the fields in which I’m moderately well-read. 
After taking an undergraduate degree in mathematical statistics, I attended 
graduate school in the history and theory of music. As a scholar, I have written on 
Handel. Mozart. Schoenberg, and historical aspects of music theory; I also teach 
music history and appreciation. and review and write liner notes for CDs. 
But let me stress from the outset that concerns about my turf do not drive my 
critique. Rather. I wish to focus on general misunderstandings about what music 
is. misunderstandings that seem to lead to a confused picture of what creativity is. 
This review will challenge some of Boden’s definitions and assumptions; first. 
however. I feel obliged to point out some of the shortcomings of Boden’s 
research, which are especially but not exclusively of the historical kind. I shall 
also identify some sources of Boden’s misunderstandings, especially where music 
is concerned; some of these can be traced back to longstanding traditions of music 
theory itself. 
2. The definition of “creativity”4 
Boden’s initial concept of creativity is very simple: she defines as creative an 
idea that has not been thought, or thinkable, before. If nobody has ever thought 
the idea, she calls it H-creative, the H standing for historical; if the idea is new to 
the individual thinker, she calls it P-. or personally, creative. 
Boden gives P-creativity pride of place in her argument, not only because there 
is far more of it, not only because the H-creative status of a thought cannot 
readily be determined, but because she wishes to make general statements about 
every case of creativity as mental activity. But Boden allows such a wide range of 
mental activity to count as P-creative that every learning event seems to be 
P-creative in some way: the thinker thinks a thought that he or she could not 
previously have thought. How creative is one when learning to read? When 
learning long division? 
(On the other hand, she rules out Chomsky’s use of “creative” to describe the 
generation of new sentences, because one could have spoken the sentence before. 
“Novel though the sentences about giant hedgehogs and dwarf tigers are, there is 
a clear sense in which each could have occurred before: each can be generated by 
the same rules that can generate other English sentences”. How close the actual 
generation of sentences is to the computational activity she then excludes from 
the realm of creativity, is something that deserves more speculation (p. 38).) 
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This broad definition is accompanied by very strong claims for the importance 
of P-creativity. I agree with Boden that, for scientific purposes, P-creativity is the 
more interesting kind, though H-creativity is the type that most people speak of 
when labeling an idea “creative”. P-creativity, after all, has at least the possibility 
of being observed or identified as it happens, to some degree; only in retrospect 
may we say that an idea was H-creative, and then only for certain kinds of ideas. 
The rest of the time, we have no way of knowing who else has thought what. 
Boden acknowledges this on page 33. When she attempts to defend it with an 
example two pages later, however, things get muddy. 
Alan Turing, it seems, applied for a fellowship in mathematics. The work he 
submitted was brilliant, but the same surprising result had been published at 
almost the same time by another mathematician. Turing, who could not have 
known the other work, received his fellowship. 
Boden sees this as evidence that “creativity as a personal quality is judged 
(during most of a person’s lifetime, if not in obituaries) primarily in terms of 
P-creativity” (p. 35). The existing Fellows who judged his work were right not to 
view Turing as less creative than the other mathematician. “To offer a fellowship 
is not to award a prize for H-creativity. Rather it is to bet on the Fellow’s 
long-term capacity for producing P-creative ideas, in the hope that some of those 
ideas will be H-creative too”. (p. 36) 
But the Fellows did no such thing. They saw that Turing’s work, but for a freak 
coincidence, would have been H-creative; and they bet, not on his capacity for 
P-creative work that might be H-creative, but on his capacity for H-creative work 
itself, based on the evidence of the case at hand. Almost-H-creative work is 
functionally equivalent to the real thing in this case; the vast majority of 
P-creative work is not, and the Fellows could tell the difference. Turing’s work 
was H-creative for all practical purposes. 
3. History 
This small example is one of many items that trouble a historian like me. I have 
presented it in order to draw attention to a lack of attention to detail that 
permeates the book. Other arguments strike me as poorly thought out as well; 
and many of them are based on tenuous or oversimplified assertions. 
At the outset (p. 4f.), Boden presents, and rejects, two older views of 
creativity. The first is Plato’s “divine madness”, a literal inspiration from the gods 
that temporarily replaces the poet’s powers of reason with some holy power. 
Boden notes, quite correctly, that Mozart nowadays receives similar treatment in 
the popular press, theater, and cinema. And she is right on target when she 
assesses such views as “myths: imaginative constructions, whose function is to 
express the values, assuage the fears and endorse the practices of the community 
that celebrates them.” (p. 4f.) 
A more modern, mitigated form of myth is 
[t]he romantic view [, ,I creativity. while not actually divine, is at least 
exceptional. Creative artists (and scientists) are said to be people gifted with 
a specific talent which others lack: insight, or intuition. [Romantics] see 
creativity as fundamentally unanalysable, and are deeply unsympathetic to 
the notion that a scientific account of it might one day be achieved. 
According to the romantic. intuitive talent is innate, a gift that can be 
squandered but cannot be acquired-or taught. (p. 5) 
Here the trouble starts. Boden’s “romantics”-who are never named in the 
book-do not correspond to any recognizable historical group. Certainly the 
German and English Romantics of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries said far more than that, and in fact engaged in heated debate over every 
point that Boden presents as their doctrine. For the discussion that follows, I have 
relied on two sources: Schaffer [ 71 and Abrams [ 11. 
First, the Romantic discussion of “genius”-not creativity-was a reaction to 
the Baroque notions of “inventiveness” and “ingenuity”, which are far closer to 
Boden’s ideas of general creative capability. Moreover, some of the Romantics, 
e.g., Moser and Goethe, were wary of the term “genius” [7. p. 821. There were 
many explicit attempts to separate genius (which, after all, was Plato’s subject, 
too) from other creativity. Which fields allowed for one or the other or both? 
Far from rejecting the idea of scientific descriptions of creativity, or even of 
genius, some Romantics (e.g.. Alexander Gerard) provided scientific analogies 
for them: genius was organic in the sense that a plant lives and grows; in the sense 
that mechanical motion or construction is not organic. Allowing for a gap of two 
centuries, this is a direct challenge to Boden’s more-or-less computational theory 
of creativity; but hardly an evasion of an attempt to analyze creativity. (See [7, p. 
84f.l. [l. pp. 184-2181.) 
Counter to Boden’s assertion, many of the Romantics believed that creativity in 
some fields-if not genius-might indeed be fostered or encouraged in talented 
individuals. Finally, Romantic science restructured itself drastically, not least by 
divorcing itself from the family of “natural philosophy” and founding the separate 
natural sciences we know today, in part because of just these debates. Genius, 
which was obviously hard to identify with certainty. was replaced by the heroism 
of the discoverer-another “H” that made H-creativity an important category [7, 
p. 94f.l. 
Now, there is no denying that the Ancient and Romantic approaches are 
unsatisfactory to us today. But this is less because of any inherent flaws in their 
approaches-even myth is perfectly acceptable in a society that places great value 
in myth-than because we, thinking about creativity here and now, have different 
interests, different purposes. In our age, the poet has neither the social status nor 
the aesthetic importance of Plato’s inspired poet; nor do we debate the difference 
between philosophy and natural science in the same way as the Romantics did. 
(The debate still rages, but with different boundaries: AI research and cognitive 
science seem to form a front, with epistemology and phenomenology on one side. 
experimental psychology on the other.) Nor could the Romantics temper their 
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thoughts about genius or inventiveness with analogies to thinking machines-such 
machines were quite unthinkable, nor could anything like them have had 
relevance to the concerns of the scientists, artists, and philosophers who engaged 
in the great debates. In short, when we ask “what is creativity”, we are asking a 
different question, one tempered by our own agenda. 
The unnamed Romantics point to another matter that will irk a historian: lack 
of references. Boden’s endnotes are far from complete; for example, the 
discussion of music that begins on page 85 is unannotated until page 87, where the 
work of Christopher Longuet-Higgins is mentioned for the first and only time; yet 
all that has come before, and much that follows, is taken directly from a reading 
of his work. (To be fair, the acknowledgements give him credit for the musical 
example on page 86.) 
A more serious example is found on page 34. There, Boden writes that “[o]ne 
literary critic, for example, has recently argued that Shakespeare was no better a 
writer than several of his contemporaries, such as Thomas Middleton.” The critic 
is Gary Taylor [8], as an endnote-why not the main text?-informs us; but there 
are no page references to guide us to any of Taylor’s assertions as summarized in 
the long paragraph that follows. I have been able to trace some, but not all, of 
Boden’s summarization of Taylor back to his book. 
What nobody will find is Taylor’s claim that Shakespeare was “no better a 
writer than . . . Middleton”, for he goes to great pains to avoid making such a 
claim (e.g., [8, pp. 374, 4071). Thus, when Boden writes, “[. . .] the relativist critic 
must not claim too much; if there are IZO literary values independent of cultural 
fashions, then one cannot say that Shakespeare was ‘really no better’ than 
Middleton, only that he was no different,” (ibid.) questions arise. 
Who said the three words in quotes ? Not Taylor, who writes about how 
Shakespeare was different from Middleton [S, pp. 408-4091. Boden is citing 
Boden (same page), but she has added the “really” to complete a grotesque 
caricature (complete with that modern insult, “relativist”) of a sober, if contro- 
versial, scholar. 
4. Music as a central example 
Boden’s interpretation of Longuet-Higgins is far more troubling. Here is a 
passage from page 87 (emphasis original): 
Longuet-Higgins shows that every interval that can possibly occur in tonal 
music can be expressed, in one and only one way, as a combination of 
octaves, perfect fifths, and major thirds. (Previous theories of harmony, since 
Helmholtz, had referred only to octaves and perfect fifths.) A composer 
choosing the “next note” of a tonal melody must choose one that is related to 
its predecessor by some specific interval selected from this search-space. 
Moreover, the theory defines the mutual relations between intervals, some 
interval-pairs being closer within harmonic space and others more distant. 
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0 Ine scarcely knows where to begin. Some basic points: 
l Helmholtz did not have a theory of harmony in the usual sense of the term. 
l The arrangement represented by Fig. 5.2 was first presented by Leonhard 
Euler in the eighteenth century (see Euler 13. p. 485]), and is a commonplace 
in the writings of harmonic theorists before and after Helmholtz. Imig [S, 
passim] shows that this network. which Euler called “Speculum Musicae”, is 
fundamental to the ideas of the school of harmonic thought known as 
Functional Harmony. which generally bases its ideas on the late-nineteenth- 
century work of Hugo Riemann. Imig [S, pp. 103ff.1, and Vogel [9, p. 101f.l 
note that the network, or “Tonnetz”, was reinvented by Arthur von 
Oettingen in 1866. Oettingen was a decisive influence on Riemann’s early 
thinking. What Boden presents is at best a reinvention of the wheel; 
Longuet-Higgins’ articles seem to take a roundabout path to the rediscovery 
of a few of Riemann’s other “functional” ideas as well. 
A key corresponds to a specific region in tonal space. When defining a key, 
one can ignore octaves. [. .I Every harmonic interval within u given key is 
definable in terms of perfect fifths and major thirds. 
Because there are now only two musical dimensions to consider, harmonic 
space can be represented by a very simple (two-dimensional) diagram. 
Longuet-Higgins constructs a spatial array, in which each note is one perfect 
fifth higher (in pitch) than the note on its left, and a major third higher than 
the note written underneath it (Figure 5.2). 
A$ lq Btj l?x Cx Gx 
Fg C# Gfl D# A# Eif 
D A E B F# C# 
Bb F (: G D A 
Gb Db Ab I% Bb I’ 
Ebb Bbb Fb Cb Gb Db 
Fig. 5.2. 
If we mark, on this array. the notes occurring within any given key, or 
scale, we find that they occur in clusters of neighbouring notes. Moreover, 
these clusters have different shapes, according to whether the key is major or 
minor. Harmonically equivalent notes (tonic, dominant, submediant, and so 
on) have the same relative position within any major (or minor) cluster. [. .] 
Modulations from one key to another exploit the fact that any two keys will 
share at least one note (C major and D minor share four). The specific 
pathways, or sequences of transitions. by which the composer can modulate 
between keys are mapped within tonal space, some being more direct than 
others. The musical subtleties involved are considerable, but Longuet-Hig- 
gins shows in detail (which need not concern us) how they follow from his 
theoretical analysis. 
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l It is equally simple, and equally reasonable, to construct the table using fifths 
and minor thirds. In fact, any two intervals whose sizes in semitones are 
relatively prime will suffice to create an array. (The uses of fifths and thirds 
within tonal music, not some abstract principle, make the tables attractive; 
indeed, one wonders what Longuet-Higgins would do (or did?) with 
deductions from first principles that didn’t sufficiently correspond to actual 
music.) Moreover, by giving diagonal moves from upper left to lower right 
the same status as right-left and up-down moves, one gives the minor third 
the same status in the table as the major third has-something that leads to 
greater congruence with the mental maps that most of us actually seem to 
have with regard to tonality. 
l Boden’s assertion that “every interval . . . can be expressed, in one and only 
one way, as a combination of octaves, perfect fifths, and major thirds” is 
immediately belied by the array. For instance, the interval from C to A is 
either three steps to the right or one up and one to the left. Her confusion 
seems to arise from her conflation of several articles in Longuet-Higgins’ 
collection of papers, some of which revise others. (Cf. the different 
discussions of the tonal array in [6, pp. 66, 71, 94, 140, 1801.) It turns out 
that Longuet-Higgins makes his claim of unique interval representation in 
the context of a highly debatable attempt to reconcile common-practice tonal 
music with pure-interval tuning, something that Boden never mentions. 
l That a composer must choose notes related by some interval in the search- 
space is trivial, as the search-space contains all intervals. So, of course, do 
several other search-spaces, including the one that only uses fifths. To make 
the array interesting, Boden would need to show that a composer-every 
tonal composer-thinks along the lines of this, and not some other, map. 
l Longuet-Higgins’ detail should indeed concern us, because it is hopelessly 
muddled as it stands. I have mentioned his use of tuning-based arguments; 
his analysis of music [6, 68f.l suggests that he is unclear as to what constitutes 
a modulation. Boden’s other comments on tonality (pp. 60-61) are even 
more frustrating. 
Boden uses this notion of “tonal space” as a basis for her thoughts on what 
composers do when they compose, and what constitutes creativity on their part. 
The array of Fig. 5.2 is, for her, a mental map of tonal space, and one aspect of 
creativity is the redefinition of mental maps, or of relationships within them. 
Earlier (p. 46f.), Boden had used the analogy of a map to describe creativity as a 
process of exploration. Mental maps, she says, are different from physical ones, 
because mental geography is itself changeable. That is, a creative idea may 
rearrange the relationships between objects that constitute our knowledge of 
something; or it may introduce new kinds of relationships. 
Now, even if we strip Fig. 5.2 of the extravagant claims Longuet-Higgins and 
Boden make for it, it is indeed a map of tonal space. But how do we get to 
creativity either way? And what arc we to do with this particular map, whose 
special claim is that it is necessary and sufficient to explain all tonal relationships? 
How will we rearrange it to be musically creative ? This question is especially 
acute, because Boden presents the “Tonnetz“ as something complete and 
unchanging. As with Turing, the example does little to further Boden’s argument. 
There is a most distressing coda to this musical episode. On page 90, Boden 
attempts to reassure us: “The map of tonal harmony drawn for us by Longuet- 
Higgins was not spawned by arbitrary speculations, but derived by abstract 
argument from first principles.” This interesting claim suggests that Longuet- 
Higgins has published his chain of arguments. To the best of my knowledge, he 
has not done so; however, the tirst of his “Two Letters to a Musical Friend” 
closes with the following: *‘But it shocks me a little that music theorists should be, 
apparently, so ignorant of the two-dimensional nature of harmonic relationships. 
This remark must sound rather impertinent coming from a non-professional 
musician, but at least it may reassure you that I am not attempting to launch upon 
the musical world a private theory of my own. The whole thing follows 
relentlessly from first principles.” [7. pp. 6%701 
Longuet-Higgins does indeed sound impertinent, but not because he lacks the 
requisite degrees. His own ignorance of the history of music theory leads him to 
comment on theorists’ apparent ignorance. Nor do the articles collected in his 
book cite more than a few harmonic theorists. or any from the Riemannian 
“Functional Harmony” tradition-which began with, and then rejected, a tuning- 
based approach similar to his own. And then Boden blithely accepts and repeats 
his bluster about first principles. Can she identify those principles? Can she 
discuss them critically‘? Clearly not. 
5. The definition of “creativity”41 
I have noted Boden’s general definition of creativity. How does she use the 
term in practice‘? 
[. .] [I]t must be admitted that [Longuet-Higgins’] programs have many 
limitations. A fortiori. they cannot interpret (compare: appreciate or under- 
stand) those cases where the composer “breaks the rules”. Longuet-Higgins 
points out, for instance. that the program which finds the correct key- 
signatures for all the fugues of the “Forty-Eight” would assign the wrong key 
to one of the fugues in the “Mass in B Minor”, because Bach there ignored a 
constraint (the rule of congruence) that he usually honored. But the 
constraint concerned is precisely specified within Longuet-Higgins’ computa- 
tional approach-which is why one can identify Bach’s creativity in ignoring 
it. (p. 91) 
Can this be? Can Bach’s creativity consist of. or reside in, his ignoring of rules 
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stated by Longuet-Higgins? This can only make sense if we can establish that 
Bach knew of such rules-and he clearly did not. Even if Longuet-Higgins’ rules, 
which are deduced from a subset of Bach’s music, turn out to be part of Bach’s 
thought-processes (and there is no reason to believe that they were), we do not 
know what he knew about breaking such rules prior to his composition of the 
“creative” fugue (are the subjects of the other fugues uncreative?); we do not 
know that he was thinking or doing anything new. 
My next example concerns the term “idea”. 
[. . .] Mozart was one of the very few people who have a constant, long- 
lasting, ability to produce H-creative ideas. Shakespeare was another, Gauss 
yet another. How is this possible? In other words, how can there be a degree 
of P-creativity so great that H-creative ideas are generated over and over 
again? (p. 253) 
Boden properly notes that the question must be asked in that way, because 
historical accident and value judgment are components of the identification of 
H-creative ideas. But the ideas themselves are hard to identify here. In a paper by 
Gauss, we can point to the novel and valuable mathematical thought-process. 
What is the “idea” in a work of Mozart, or in a soliloquy by Shakespeare? A 
hundred critics will point to a hundred things. 
The inability to identify artistic “ideas” destroys Boden’s attempt to unite 
artistic and scientific creativity. For, even though scientific creativity, value, and 
notions of idea are socially constructed (as Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend have 
taught us), we can at least sometimes point to a creative moment, a crucial event 
that distinguishes the old thought-process from the new, when we contemplate a 
“creative” work of science or mathematics. (On the other hand, would we 
consider Kekule’s model of the benzene ring quite so creative if we didn’t know of 
his dream?) Music and poetry, however, are generally considered creative in their 
wholes; individual elements and aspects are not generally the crux of our 
judgment of them as creative. And we tend to distinguish creativity from novelty, 
or to recognize novelty as only one-not necessarily central---element of crea- 
tivity. 
Boden confirms this in the passage that follows, but falls into other traps: 
Thinking can be H-creative-indeed, superlatively H-creative-in different 
ways. For instance, I have heard some musicians argue that Haydn was more 
daring than Mozart, that he challenged the musical rules more than Mozart 
did. If so, then Mozart’s H-creativity was primarily a matter of exploring the 
rules to their limits (and bending and tweaking them at many unexpected 
points), rather than breaking them at a fundamental evel. In other words, 
the glory of a Mozart symphony may be largely based in richly integrated 
musical equivalents of Dickens’ exploratory use of seven adjectives to quality 
one noun: we hear it with delighted amazement, for we never realized that 
the relevant structural constraints had such a potential. Someone who agreed 
with this musical judgment might nevertheless regard Mozart as the greater 
genius-perhaps because his music is more diverse than Haydn’s, or because 
it shows us the full potential of a given genre even though he did not invent it 
in the first place. 
Whether or not an instance of H-creativity involves exceptionally radical 
transformation, it must involve the exploration of conceptual spaces. Accord- 
ingly, expertise is essential. If one does not know the rules (not even tacitly), 
one can neither bend nor break them. Or rather. one cannot do so in a 
systematic way. (p. 353) 
In fact, Mozart’s music is not more diverse than Haydn’s, nor does it 
necessarily explore this or that genre more fully than Haydn’s did (one need only 
consider the quartets, symphonies. and Masses Haydn wrote in the 1790s). Boden 
seems determined to plead Mozart’s case at any cost-even by taking up claims 
that are direct consequences of the Romantic and divine-inspiration myths that 
Boden identifies at the beginning of her book, as they have been routinely applied 
to Mozart. 
Boden’s misunderstanding of the nature of musical “rules”, even in the teeth of 
her own idea of mental maps, leads to an unanalyzable definition of creativity, the 
thing she accused the Romantics and Plato of making. It is unanalyzable because 
we do not know Mozart’s rules. Or, more precisely, we need to recognize that 
Mozart’s rule-based mental activity was concerned with precisely his rules, not 
some standard set, and certainly not a set of rules derived from our observation of 
his compositions. Mozart gained his knowledge of music, not by assimilating some 
standard mental maps of tonality, rhythm, and the like, but by his own hearing 
and processing of musical experience upon musical experience. His mental map 
was unlike Haydn’s, and unlike Boden’s or mine. It was based on subjective 
hearings, on personal interpretations and tastes, on choices of what to learn and 
what to master, on a myriad things. Not only Mozart’s explorations, rule- 
bendings, and rule-breakings, but also his conceptual spaces and his rules, were 
his own. 
To be sure, Mozart and his audiences knew the same music, understood 
musical figures and gestures to mean more or less the same things, shared ideas of 
what was right or beautiful or proper in music. But it is equally certain that 
Mozart heard and construed music in his own way. When Mozart wrote a piece, 
was this a creative act‘? Or did the creative act occur sometime before, when 
Mozart remade his personal musical map--learned something-in a way that 
made it possible for him to write this (or any number of other possible) pieces? 
What, then, do we mean on the many occasions that we utter a sentence like 
“This piece is creative”. or “Mozart was a creative genius”? To put it bluntly, we 
mean that we like the music, and little more than that. Perhaps we also mean that 
certain other people, such as later composers, also liked it; but we need not be 
able to point to anything new or redefined within the “creative” piece. Is Mozart’s 
piano concerto No. 18 in F major, K. 456, creative? There is certainly nothing 
especially new in the harmonies; every cluster of notes-melodies or chords-is 
much like one to be found elsewhere. The novelty of the piece is pretty much 
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intangible within the piece itself; we can only say that we enjoy hearing it, and 
like it as much as we would if it turned out that it had been written, say, before 
No. 16 or after No. 19, i.e., if some of its formal devices were either more or less 
original. When we appreciate the piece, the composer’s P-creativity, and even 
H-creativity, are generally of little concern to us-not least because we can’t 
know where or whether either one is present. What’s creative about the piece is 
the features that lead us to like it; what’s creative about Mozart is his ability to 
write this piece and several others like it-all of which are also unlike it. 
How did we get into this mess? And how do we get out? Boden took on the 
immense challenge of discussing scientific and artistic creativity as though they 
were aspects of one and the same thing. She acknowledges that the value of an 
idea is one component of our judgment of it as creative; but value in art and 
science are vastly different things. 
And ideas in art and science are different, too. We can often isolate the 
scientific idea; the artistic one is harder to surround. When KekulC published his 
structural model of the benzene ring, he was reporting an idea, and the results of 
it. Mozart’s piano concerto is not a report, nor can we speak of the idea or ideas 
in it and agree on what we mean. 
6. Music as a science 
The prominent place given to music in Boden’s discussions (as compared to 
playwriting and painting, art-forms that also figure in her discussion, e.g., pp. 
34-35, 145, 249) points to a likely source of all the confusion: the notion that 
music, among all the arts, has a large scientific component. 
To be sure, we describe the sounds that make up music in terms of number, 
just as we speak of molecules or perfect squares. This has been the case since 
Pythagoras. Moreover, there is a long tradition of discussing musical entities in 
terms of the effects inherent in them, the effects that they naturally have on any 
(competent) human listener (e.g., Plato’s Republic, Section 399). 
Throughout the middle ages, music resided with arithmetic, geometry and 
astronomy among the liberal arts, not with rhetoric, logic and grammar; it was 
considered a natural force, not so much a tool for the expression of what its user 
wanted to say. 
Music theory since Classical times has almost always contained a large dose of 
acoustical physics. In recent centuries, not only Mersenne, Euler and Helmholtz, 
but also Rameau, Riemann, Schenker, and Hindemith have felt it necessary to 
begin with a discussion of overtones, harmonic properties, etc. Among the arts, 
only music has classes in “theory” that all students must take from early on: 
harmony, melody, rhythm, structure, etc. are all taught from textbooks. Painters 
and novelists do not learn this way. The rise of notation in Western music had 
much to do with this: the notated work could be studied at any time, and criticism 
and theoretical discussion often seemed to substitute it for the sounding object. 
That Boden has fallen victim to this commonplace scientistic picture of music is 
suggested especially by her main examples. The confusion of Longuet-Higgins’ 
analytic rules with some supposed compositional rules (p. 90, etc.) is an extreme 
case of confusion about music theory: the rules given to students to be learned 
and “broken” when necessary are not inherent or underlying rules of music, not 
even necessarily derivable from actual practice. At best, they are attempts to 
describe certain processes in certain music after the fact. (“Sonata form”, another 
term Boden uses as though it were scientific. was not known until around the time 
of Beethoven’s death; and its exemplars arc generally drawn from music written 
before then.) 
Boden’s examples focus almost exclusively on tonality and other matters of 
pitch. Many music theorists have also succumbed to the temptation to confuse 
facts about pitch with general laws governing music, and to elevate pitch above all 
other elements. Rhythm, timbre. text-setting, and so on often seem to be 
secondary, or even extraneous matters. This, in turn, is partly because they are 
less easily represented in mathematical sorts of notations and do not yield 
themselves as readily to mathematical analysis. In any case, a “mental map of 
tonality” would only be a part of any listener’s experience of a work. 
Helmholtz, cited on page 87 as a theorist. explicitly refused to extend his 
acoustical observations beyond some very general thoughts about harmony; he 
admitted that art and custom, not acoustics. determined the rules of part-writing. 
“In the last part of my book, I have endeavoured to show that the construction of 
scales and of harmonic tones is a product of artistic invention, and by no means 
furnished by the natural formation or natural function of the ear, as it has hitherto 
been asserted.” [4. p. 3651 
And all of the technical components put together are still not what we mean 
when we call a work of music-or other art-creative. Perhaps our positive 
judgment of a piece will send us in search of theoretical, technical. or historical 
novelties, but no theoretical analysis of a hitherto unknown work will send us to 
listen to it as “creative” music. 
Music, with all its rules and the simple mathematical properties of its 
components, is the art that looks most like a science. Boden’s scientific approach 
can ultimately be traced back to this confusion. The idea that there are “first 
principles” from which one can derive harmony, etc. is attractive; but it ignores 
both the actual, idiosyncratic ways of music and its general nature. Helmholtz said 
it best: artistic invention (which we might call “creativity”!), not calculation, 
logic, and psychoacoustics alone. created the tonal system we know and love. 
7. Conclusion 
Are we left with nothing but the myths of creativity that Boden disdains? 1 
think not. But we cannot avoid the recognition that Mozart’s genius is ultimately 
a matter of taste. not mechanism. Musicologists such as myself have no interest in 
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“identifying all the structures implicit in the . . . music”. Our analysis of music, in 
the end, is a story that attempts to put the things we enjoy listening to in some 
perspective or relationship with one another; and the structures we identify are 
our own expectations of music, and those of Mozart’s listeners, which his music 
sometimes addresses, and sometimes does not. 
Those Romantics unnamed by Boden debated whether genius could exist 
outside the arts. This very debate was one of the reasons that natural philosophy 
split off from the rest of philosophy; thus was modern science born. If nothing 
else, the Romantics realized that the value of science was different from the value 
of a work of art. Let us not forget that as we apply the epithet “creative” to useful 
science and stimulating art. 
And let us not forget to ask the most important question of all: what’s so 
important about creativity? Why do we value it? There is no denying that we do, 
certainly in matters of science. We value the results of scientific creativity highly, 
and can point to the tangible results of this or that creative act. Our lives are 
different because of benzene chemistry, because of group theory, because of 
genetics. Could it be that our entirely proper appreciation of scientific creativity 
has led us to assume that creativity of the same type is necessarily the key to 
artistic value? 
One more time, the Romantics answer in the affirmative. For it was in the late 
eighteenth century that originality and radical newness became central aesthetic 
categories. In the nineteenth century, the era we associate with a rationalistic 
faith in scientific and technical progress, musical progress (based largely on an 
image-a myth?-of Beethoven as revolutionary) was similarly seen as the 
essence of a great new composition. Can we still maintain that view? After all, the 
music we consider “great” is generally that of the two centuries before our own. 
It matters very little whether one piece we like was written before another, except 
when we enjoy noting the influence of one on the other. And we enjoy both 
pieces in the here and now, in ways that we do not enjoy scientific discoveries of 
the past. Only insofar as discoveries have enhanced our lives via further progress 
do we value them any more. 
In the discussion of Shakespeare and Shakespeare reception noted above, 
Boden writes, “It does not follow that there is no difference between the intrinsic 
merits-the literary creativity-f Shakespeare’s works and Middleton’s. That has 
to be argued independently.” (p. 34.) Gary Taylor agrees-and spends his final 
chapter demonstrating that we have never been able to agree on what the intrinsic 
merits are, and that critical evaluations often reverse themselves completely over 
time [8, pp. 373-4111. Boden here explicitly identifies creativity with “intrinsic 
merits”, ignoring the obvious challenge to name those merits. She speaks of ideas 
inherent in works of art: what ideas? 
The reader may by now have noted that we are again focusing on H-creativity, 
or at least on the creativity of great thinkers. How do we make the leap to 
ordinary, everyday creativity and its valuation? Boden’s own definition of P- 
creativity suggests a generalization to “learning”; by studying how people learn 
(to speak, to read, to play chess, etc.) we will begin to accrue a little knowledge 
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of personal mental maps as they actually exist in humans. However a computer 
may explore previously defined mental maps. it does not draw them in the first 
place; and I see no reason to believe that humans all acquire the same map (of 
language, of musical tonality, even of chemical structures) as they learn. 
And since learning (and many of the acts that one or another of us might feel 
comfortable in describing as “creative” without seeing them as learning processes) 
generally takes place in a social situation, or at least with books, we may begin to 
look for creativity in the friction that occurs when we rub two minds together: 
when two people with different mental maps of the same area attempt to 
communicate. What has happened when they succeed‘? 
Boden, despite her efforts, must still confront all the different meanings of “X 
is valuable” and “X is creative” where X is either a scientific discovery or an 
artistic creation. Even in everyday cognition-where most P-creative acts occur- 
we must confront these and other distinctions or lose ourselves in a hopeless 
project of doing research with undefined or contradictory terms and goals. We 
cannot pretend to smash idols (the “myths” with which Boden begins), while 
defending our own tastes and comfortable prejudices (e.g., regarding Mozart and 
Haydn, artistic “ideas”. and “intrinsic merits”) in the name of science. 
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